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Abstract:
Most studies on the problem of optimal soil conservation have analyzed soil conservation measures as
being time-limited in their e ffect. This paper extends previous analyses of the soil conservation decision
by allowing farmers to make investments in soil conservation structures such as terraces, bundles and
ditches. It shows that the main conclusions arrived at in previous studies remain valid. The long-term
effects of unanticipated permanent changes in prices and discount rates may go either way inde-
pendent of whether conservation measures are time-limited or have lasting effects on the
soil base.
Keywords: Land degradation, investment in structures, comparative statics.
EL classification: Q12; Q24.
Address: Sverre Grepperud, Statistics Norway, Research Department,
P.O.Box 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: sgr@ssb.no

1. Introduction'
The problem of land degradation, soil erosion and soil conservation is frequently analysed through
optimal control models, since the choice is inherently a dynamic one, involving both intertemporal and
mtratemporal trade-offs. Two important policy questions are how do changes in prices and discount rates
affect the incentives for soil conservation2. Barrett (1991) applies a model first presented by McConnel
(1983) to analyse such issues, in which the soil loss rate depends directly only on cultivation intensity.
More general models are provided by Barbier (1990), LaFrance (1992) and Barrett (1995) all focusing on
soil conservation measures. In addition, each analysis considers additional variables which are assumed to
affect land degradation and soil erosion.
Barbier (1990) and Barrett (1995) focus on the problem of soil erosion, and the stock variable in their
studies is defined as soil depth. Barbier (1990) considers two control variables: first, a productive input
package (productive inputs, labour, crop varieties and cropping practices) which is assumed to increase
both output and soil loss and secondly, a soil conservation package assumed to reduce soil loss. Barrett
(1995) considers three control variables: cultivation intensity, conservation inputs, and non-soil inputs.
Here, a higher intensity of cultivation increases both output and soil loss, while conservation inputs
reduce soil loss. Non-soil inputs increase output but have no direct effect on soil loss. LaFrance (1992)
focuses on the problem of land degradation where the stock variable represents soil fertility and can be
interpreted as an index of several soil charachteristics as e.g. infiltration rate, content of organic matter,
structure, nutrient content and soil depth. LaFrance (1992) considers crop increasing/land degrading inputs
(fertilizer, irrigation, ploughing) and soil conserving/crop reducing inputs3 .
A common feature in all models is that soil conservation efforts are assumed to be effective only in the
time period they are implemented. In order for such measures to have lasting effects, the actual activity
has to be repeated every crop season. Some conservation activities may well be described as time-limited
with respect to their effectiveness, but most soil conservation measures have beneficial consequences
beyond the current period. The implementation of structura conservation measures may be viewed as
investments in land, since structures will have an anticipated life well beyound that of the present crop
(Blailcie and Br000kfield, 1987). These structural measures involve constructions such as terraces,
bundles, ditches, stone walls, windbreaks and drainage systems which dampen the soil loss rate and may
increase the productivity of land through higher infiltration rates and a more stable supply of water.
Measures of this kind are frequently applied both in developed and less developed agriculture. In some
regions such techniques have been a part of traditional agriculture, where farmers have adapted to the
environment by terracing and constructing drainage channels. In other regions, the implemetation of
structures has occurred in response to international and national agencies targeting soil conservation
packages on more erosion-prone areas in many developing countries.
I am grateful to J.T LaFrance and A. Seierstead for helpful discussions. I also thank J. Strand, K. Alfsen and P.F.
2 See Barrett (1995) for an explanation of how macroeconomic and sectoral policies affect prices and discount rates.
3 See LaFrance (1992) and the references therein for how irrigation and fertilizers may degrade long-term soil fertility.
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This paper analyses the role and implications of soil conservation measures with lasting effects on output.
Because of their durability, structures are treated as capital goods and attention is paid to the dynamics of
soil-conserving capital. A partial micro economic analysis is conducted in order to study how the soil
conservation decisions of land managers with perfect foresight respond to unanticipated permanent
changes in prices and the discount rate. The analysis is confined to long-run influences of policy on the
optimal soil conservation decision, and hence the analysis focuses on steady state. The analysis addresses
neither income effects nor the effect of changes in agricultural output prices on the dicount rate.
Furthermore, this paper deals only with peasants who cultivate their own land, and no land-leasing
contracts are considered5 .
Section 2 introduces the investment model of soil conservation. Here, the optimality conditions are
derived together with a presentation of both the user cost and the shadow price of structures. In section 3
the long-term effects of changes in output price and the discount rate on the soil base are analyzed.
Concluding remarks complete this investigation.
2. An investment model of soil conservation
The land degradation model presented below draws on the work of LaFrance (1992). The conservation
inputs of this model are here replaced by conservation capital, while the modeling of productive inputs
remains unchanged. The soil dynamics is described by the following equation,
= - G(Z„K)
	 (1)
where M is a constant representing the natural rate of soil regeneration. Z t is a vector of productive
inputs, and IC, is the stock of conservation structures. Productive inputs degrade the soil, the larger the
stock of structures (Kt) the lower the soil and fertility losses6 .
The structure dynamics is as follows,
K =
 I - 81Ct
	 (2)
As in neo-classical investment theory, the change in stock of structures depends on the investment rate (It)
less the depreciation of the structures. Structures are assumed to depreciate at a constant geometric rate
(8) (replacement investments are a fixed proportion of existing capital stock).
The adoption of structure conservation measures involves different types of immediate costs for the far-
mer since resources are needed to construct and maintain the structures. First, labour as such is necessary,
4 Barbier (1990) and LaFrance (1992) consider both short- and long-term (steady state) responses to policy changes, while
Barrett (1991, 1995) restricts his analysis to steady state.
5 Barrett (1995) argues in favour of the discount rate being affected by increased uncertainty about property rights.
6 Besides arresting water erosion, structures also encourage the retention of moisture and stimulate improvements in the
soil's physical structure [Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche, 1994].
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either hired or provided by the household. Secondly, to construct effective structures information, equip-
ment and materials may be needed, all causing expenditures for the household. The implementation cost
of the structures is assumed to be strictly convex in investment (I) and is represented by the function
C(I)7 .
The variable Z, in addition to productive input use, may also reflect fanning practices and cropping
techniques. More intensive cultivation
 (a higher value of Z) degrades the soil and implies higher labour
requirements. Examples are tillage methods (none, minimum, traditional), contour ploughing, repeated
tillage, timing decisions, the burning of stubble on harvested land and the number of annual harvests.
More intensive cultivation can also be interpreted as parcels of land being left fallow for shorter periods
of time. R(Z), the productive cost function is convex and reflects not only costs of inputs but also the
opportunity cost of labour.
In addition to soil fertility (S) and productive inputs (Z r), the stock of structures (K) is also introduced as
an argument in the production function, and is intended to represent the net result of two contradicting
effects. The structures themselves take up permanently some productive land, depending on slope and
gradient, this may cause reductions in output. Furthermore, there is an indirect effect of structures besides
arresting soil and fertility losses in that land productivity may rise due to both a more stable supply of
water and an improved infiltration rate which allows water to soak deeper into the ground. As a conse-
quence, the immediate net effect of the stock of structures in production may go either way8. Output is
then given by the production function, F(S„Zt,IC).
Let P denote the fixed price of the farm output and r the rate of discount. The land manager's problem for
a given area of land then becomes (time references will in the following be omitted for notational
convenience) 9
Max
 f -10[PF(S,Z,K)-R(Z)-C(1)]e -"ilt (3)o
7 The assumption of a convex cost function is necessary both to avoid an all-or-nothing investment policy and to fulfill the
conditions for an optimal solution in this problem (see App.1). However, in many situations it is reasonable to believe that
implementation costs increase in the rate of investment. Costs associated with replacement investments are assumed to be rather
low, while structure-expanding investments involve much more resources (net investment). Such investments are labour intensive
and may necessitate hiring of labour and the purchase of tools. Initiation of large-scale projects may also necessitate additional
costs of mobilising, organising and monitoring the labour force which implements the structures.
8 Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994) find that the construction of structures reduces the effective areas by 10 to 15 percent.
White and Jickling (1992), on a study on Haiti, report that infertile subsoil is brought to the surface during construction of
structures resulting in production declines.
9 The problem presented in LaFrance (1992) is as follows:
CID
Max fz,c [Pfis ry t) -wx t-vy tie -11dt	 s.t. = g(xt,y)
o
where s is the soil base, x productive inputs, y conservation inputs, and w and v are the market prices of x and y, respectively.
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subject to (1) and (2), the initial restrictions
 S(0)=S>0, and K(0)=K>0 and the control restrictions
Z(0)..0, and I>_0 10 .
The following assumptions are made concerning the technology;
F>0, F58<0, F>0, F<0, FKK<O, F 	 F 	0
Q
R>0, RA, C?0, C>0, Gz>0, GA, GtO, G
where subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout the paper e.g. F s am,z,Kyas. There are
diminishing returns to soil fertility, productive inputs, and the stock of structures. More soil increases the
marginal productivity of productive inputs. The soil fertility rate, G(Z,K), is assumed to be convex in
both productive inputs and stock of structures. This implies that the marginal increase in fertility loss due
to additional use of productive inputs is highest or (unchanged) for high productive input levels. The
marginal reduction in soil fertility loss due to an increase in the stock of structures is highest for low
initial levels of structures. The cross partial derivative of the soil loss function will be discussed later.
Furthermore, it is natural to assume that;
lim S(t)0 and
 Jim K(t)0	 (4)
The current value Hamiltonian associated with the problem is":
H = Ao[PF(S,Z,K) - R(Z) - C(1)] + l(M - G(Z,K)) + ii(I - 8K) 	 (5)
Assuming interior solutions, the sufficient conditions for an optimal solution are (see App.1 for further
details);
(6)
-
CIO) + 	lÅ 	= 0
	PFz(S,Z,K) - R(Z) - A,Gz(Z,K) = 0	 (7)
- rA = -PFs(S,Z,K)	 (8)
	- rp, = -PFK(S,Z,K) +1GI (Z,K) +i18	 (9)
Eq.(6) describes the optimal investment rate by balancing short-term costs against long-term benefits.
Along the optimal investment path (optimal pattern of structure accumulation) the marginal cost reduction
associated with a lower investment rate must equal the shadow value of structures. The assumption of a
10 It is assumed throughout that the optimal investment policy for the land manager always results in I(t).0, since the
assumption of investments in structures being irreversible seems reasonable.
11 It follows from Q that the Hamiltonian (H) is strictly concave in S, K, Z and I, respectively.
6
convex cost function forces the farmer to pay attention to the future, as too rapid accumulation of
structures will be costly. Eq.(7) states that the marginal costs and marginal benefits of additional use of
productive inputs must be equal at optimum. The marginal cost is defined as the marginal increase in
cultivation costs plus the (shadow) value of the soil lost due to that increase, while the marginal benefit is
the profit obtained from a marginal increase in the use of productive inputs. Eqs.(8) and (9) determine the
adjustment in the shadow values 7 and g along the optimal paths.
Expressions for the shadow values may be derived from the above conditions. Solving (8) yields the
following expression for the current value multiplier (X)
CO
A(t) = et f[PFs(S(r),Z(T),K(T))e -"kk 	 (10)
The shadow value of soil (2) at optimum equals the change in income caused by a marginal reduction in
soil depth at time t for all future periods. Solving (9) yields the following expression for the shadow
value of structures (g);
CO
= -e ("6)t f[A,GK(Z,,,K,)
The shadow value of structures is equal to the change in net income caused by a marginal reduction in
the stock of structures at time t for all future periods, and consists of two terms. The first term of the
integral is the change in the marginal soil loss rate multiplied by the current shadow value of soil, which
together yield an expression for the income loss caused by a marginal reduction in K at time t due to a
lower soil fertility. The second term is the loss or gain of immediate production from having a lower
stock of structures. Taking the integral of the two terms implies that both losses and gains are considered
for every future time period.
Comparing this model with the model of LaFrance (1992) has some interesting implications. The optimal
soil conservation decision, the balancing of short-term costs against long-term benefits, differs across the
two models. In LaFrance (1992), conservation inputs are employed until their marginal cost (unit cost)
equals their marginal benefit, where the marginal benefit is defined as the gain associated with a higher
stock of soil measured by the shadow price of land. In the investment model, by contrast, the marginal
benefit associated with devoting more resources to soil conservation (investing in structures) is measured
by the shadow price of structures [see (6)]. The marginal gains associated with soil conservation are no
longer fully and solely reflected in the shadow price of soil, owing to the durability of soil conserving
capita112. As with time-limited conservation inputs, an increase in the amount of resources devoted to soil
conservation at time t will reduce the loss in soil fertility in all subsequent periods. In addition, the capital
formation of structures will have effects on the rate of fertility loss beyond the period of time they are
implemented; there will be a prevalent effect on future soil fertility until the increment in the stock of soil
conserving capital is depreciated.
12 This comparison is done under the assumption of conservation inputs and conservation structures not being arguments in
the production function in LaFrance (1992) and the investment model, respectively.
In the literature soil conservation has been viewed as investments along the lines of depletion theory,
through absistence from depleting a resource. Investments in this sense involve a sacrifice of current
production, but leave more for future consumption. When soil conservation measures are considered to
have a life beyond that of the present crop, an additional dimension of conservation measures is
introduced more in line with standard investment theory, as the formation of capital in order to produce a
future stream of goods at the expense of current consumption or production. Devoting more resources to
soil conserving capital entails both the formation of structures (capital) and the prevention of the
depreciation of the soil asset.
3. The effect of changes in output price and discount rate
To study the long-term impacts of policy reforms on the optimal soil conservation decision, shifts in both
the discount rate and the output price are considered in steady state. Steady state equilibrium is attained
when
=11 =,1=k=o. 	 (12)
Letting tildes denote steady-state values, and imposing the stationarity conditions (12) on (6)-(9) implies
cx.i)	 =	 (6)
Rz(2) "ii,Gz(2k) = pFz0,24	
(7)
PFs(Š,i,t)
(8')
PFK(Š,2,1Z)—XGA,(2,k)	 (9)
r+8
Equations (6') -(9') can be readily combined to derive the following steady-state optimality conditions:
PF	 G K(2,IZ)
C1(1)(r 8) = PF(SAI?) 	 (13)
R(Z) GOA)  pF	 PFz(W) (14)r
The expression on the left-hand side of (13) may be viewed as the user cost of structures, where the
investment costs are adjusted for discounting and depreciation, represented by r and 8, respectively. It is
seen that the agricultural output price affects this optimality condition through the shadow value of soil
[X(T)} and through the effect of structures on immediate production [F K(S,K)]. A higher discount rate also
affects the same condition in two ways. One effect reduces the shadow price of soil, thus making soil
conservation less attractive on the margin. This effect is the same as in Barbier (1990), LaFrance (1992),
and Barrett (1995). The other effect, however, is new. Here, the user cost of structures increases as a
result of a higher discount rate. This effect will also weaken the incentives for investing in soil
conservation measures.
IL
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To analyse long-term consequences of permanent changes in output price and discount rate on soil
fertlity, (1), (2), (13) and (14) evaluated in steady state are differentiated with respect to S, Z, K, P, and r.
The following expression is derived for the impact of a change in the output price, where D>0 is shown
to be required for a saddle point equilibrium (see Appendix 1 for further details).
dS
dP pHzzlcirp [rRz(3 1 rqr+45)132 (PFzGE + PFKGA-3 31
	 (15)
The definitions of 13 1 , 02, and 03 evaluated in steady state are as follows (arguments are omitted);
= Gza(r+8)Cli+ GziGKK + GKPF.A7 GF- GKiGizz
132 = Grrizz+
= GK./Yu— &Fn.
It is clear by inspection that eq. (15) cannot be signed in general, since both pp p2, and 33 are
indeterminate. A permanent increase in the price of crops influences the incentives for soil conservation,
but the effects could go either way. This result is equivalent to the results arrived at in the analyses of
both LaFrance (1992) and Barrett (1995)' . Whether conservation inputs are assumed to be time-limited or
having prevalent effects does not change these conclusions.
This result is not surprising when studying the effects of price changes on soil fertility for each of two
input groups at a time. LaFrance (1992) has already shown that a higher price will reduce steady-state
soil fertility, if conservation inputs are kept constant throughout the planning horizon. This partial result
will also emerge from this model due to the similar specification of productive inputs across the two
models. If productive inputs are kept constant throughout the planning horizon ((14) drops out), the same
change yields a different result. A higher output price now strengthens the incentives for soil
conservation, independent of the assumptions made about FK(S,Z,K) (see App.2.1). If FK(S,Z,K)...?. 0,
entailing that the positive effect of a more stable water supply on immediate output dominates loss of
output due to loss of productive land. Two effects of a higher output price are identified, both
strengthening the incentives for arresting soil depletion. First, a positive shift in the agricultural output
price raises the immediate marginal benefit of building up structures. Secondly, the shadow value of the
soil, and thereby the shadow value of structures, increases with the output price. If the opposite and
probably more reasonable assumption is made that structures reduce immediate production, FK(S,Z,K)<O,
we have two opposing effects of which the second is always dominated by the first one.
We have identified two contradicting direct effects on soil fertility for each of the two input groups in the
model. The fundamenta reason for the different direction of change on the soil conservation incentives
for the two input groups is the different implications soil conservation has on input costs. To reduce soil
13 Barrett (1995) introduces a third control variable, non-soil inputs, which increase production when supplied in larger
quantities, but have no direct effect on soil erosion. A change in the output price will result in adjustments also in optimal input
levels for such inputs, which again have consequences for the optimal choice of cultivation intensity and conservation inputs.
Hence, additional effects on the optimal soil conservation decision are introduced by such a specification of the model.
fertility rates by the build-up of conservation capital more resources are needed. To reduce the fertility
loss by less use of productive inputs, less resources need to be devoted to this activity.
The effect of a higher discount rate on the steady state soil stock is as follows:
,
dr	 Hz2,Cfie ?1 + i'12 + 13)
(16)
The definitions of
 y, 72, and y3 evaluated in steady state are (arguments are omitted)
= HzzGi(ril- iGK)+ GzGzi- GEGzilPFsz >0
= GzGz(PFsKfiCit- IPF,)
173 = —(rÇí - 25Gir)HzK
It is clear by inspection that (16) cannot be signed, since both y2 and y3 are indeterminate. Further
assumptions on the technology are needed to reach definite conclusions. This result is more surprising in
view of the partial effects for each of the two input groups. The effect of a higher discount rate on
steady-state soil fertility is negative both for productive inputs (see LaFrance, 1992) and for conservation
structures (see App.2).
However, an increase in the discount rate does not unequivocally reduce steady-state soil fertility in the
full model. The reason is that a general model introduces additional (indirect) effects arising from both
the fertility loss function and the production function, not present when analysing each input group
separately. This result also coincides with that of Barrett (1995). Barbier (1990) and LaFrance (1992), on
the other hand, find that the direction of change will in general be unambiguous, as more myopic
households will keep a lower long-term stock of the soil resource, the higher the discount rate is. Their
results, however, arise from different assumptions on technology 14. Barbier assumes a positive cross
partial derivative of the soil loss function, implying that an increase in conservation inputs increases soil
loss attributable to an increase in productive inputs. "Barbier makes this assumption upon observing that
farmers often adopt soil conservation measures only after they switch to producing more erosive (and
valuable crops) [Barrett, 1995, p.14]". Barrett (1994) and LaFrance (1992) make a more appealing
assumption, namely that conservation mitigates the soil loss effect (soil degrading effects) of cultivation
(productive inputs).
Sufficient conditions for the discount rate to weaken the incentives for soil conservation in the investment
model are: FsK.?..0 and HzePFzic-XGrK <0, with both y2 and y3 becoming positive. GzK <0 is not a
sufficient condition for a lower steady-state soil fertility in response to a higher discount rate in the
investment model. Even if Gm >0, additional assumptions on changes in the marginal productivities of
14 LaFrance's conclusion follows from his assumptions on the current value Hamiltonian function (H 	0).
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both soil and productive inputs from more conservation capital are needed, to reach a unique conclusion 15 .
Hence, a higher discount rate can in principle both improve or worsen the incentives for soil conser-
vation. The conclusion in Barrett (1995) remains true despite the additional negative effect on soil fertility
identified in the investment model, which arises from a higher discount rate through the user cost of
structures.
Although the effect of discount rate changes on soil conservation could go either way, smooth functional
forms will in general yield a negative effect. It is then reasonable to expect that higher discount rates in
general will dampen the incentives for soil conservation. One important condition for arriving at a
different conclusion is that the marginal fertility loss due to more intensive cultivation is strongly reduced
with the accumulation of structures .
4. Conclusion
The main result of this analysis concerns the treatment of soil conservation methods as an investment in
land. In the literature so far, erosion-preventing inputs and soil conservation practices have been analyzed
within a framework where they are assumed to be time-limited with respect to their effectiveness in
arresting soil erosion and soil depletion. However, many of the important methods for conserving the soil
have effects beyond the current crop season. As a consequence, the investment decision for a farmer
becomes more than just a reduction in the actual soil loss rate during an interval of time, which in turn
keeps soil depth higher over a longer term. Investment in soil conservation measures is also the build-up
of soil conserving capital which mitigates the degradation of land over a longer period of time. For such
conserving measures the shadow value of structures (or the user cost of structures) describes the optimal
soil conservation decision.
The investment model studied in this paper introduces both a different optimality condition for soil
conservation and some new effects of changes in prices and discount rates on the optimal steady-state soil
stock compared to previous models. However, analysing soil conservation as an investment in land will
not contradict the main conclusions arrived at in other models on land degradation and soil erosion. In
order to predict the outcome of the optimal soil conservation decision, detailed information is needed on
input use, the actual soil conservation measures applied and production technology.
The results from this study are not surprising considering the similarity in structure between conservation
inputs and conservation structures. The investment model approaches the model of LaFrance (1992) as the
rate of depreciation goes to one, entailing that structures have no effect beyond the period of time in
which they are implemented. The fundamental cause for the opposite direct effects of price changes
across the two input groups on optimal soil conservation is found in the way inputs costs are connected to
the endeavors of reducing fertility losses. For both conservation inputs and structures more resources are
needed to combat fertility losses. For productive inputs, however, the effect is opposite. Here, less input
use is needed to reduce soil mining.
15 In LaFrance (1992), more conservation inputs are assumed to reduce the marginal productivity of both productive inputs
and soil.
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The total effect of changes in the discount rate on the optimal soil conservation decision is also in
principle ambiguous. An additional negative effect on soil depth from increases in the discount rate is
identified when analysing soil conserving capital rather than conservation inputs. However, the presence
of this effect is not sufficient for predicting that a rise in the discount rate will unambiguously lower the
equilibrium soil depth.
The model considered assumes that farming practices, conservation methods and inputs can be classified
as either crop increasing/land degrading or crop reducing/land improving. This need not always be the
case. The net effect from some inputs may be beneficial both for the resource base and immediate output.
One example could be chemical fertilizers. The application of fertilizers will provide land with a denser
vegetation providing a better protection of soils, thereby preventing water run-off. In some cases this
effect could offset the land degrading effects arising from the use of the same input (acidification).
Another example is organic fertilizers such as dung and crop residues, which improve soil fertility by
supplying organic matter and nutrients to the soil and at the same time protect land cover from erratic
onsets from wind and rain. The introduction of such crop increasing/land improving inputs could well be
analyzed within our model. As mentioned above, the partial effect of an increase in the output price will
depend on the way in which input costs are connected to actions implemented for reducing fertility losses.
As is the case for crop reducing/land improving inputs, additional input use is needed to reduce the
degradation of soils for crop increasing/land improving inputs. Thus, the partial effect of a higher output
price on steady-state soil fertility will be positive for such inputs.
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Appendix 1
Sufficient conditions for problem (3)
If A,o=1, the sufficient conditions for (6)-(9) to describe an optimal solution are [Seierstad and Sydsæter
1987, Theorem 13];
A.1.1)
a) lim[e -"A(S-S*)+e -rtp(K-K*)] k CI for all admissable S and K.
Since (S*(t), K*(t), X(t), g(t)) --> (S,K,X,p) when t-->c» (see below) and given assumption (4), A.1.1. holds.
b) H* = Max H is concave in (S,K).	 (A.1.2)
I is defined from (6) and will maximise H since C(I) is strictly convex. Z is defined from (7) and
maximises H since H is strictly concave in Z. A sufficient condition for A.1.2. is that H is concave in
(S,K,I,Z).
Sufficient and necessary conditions for a local saddle point equilibrium for problem (3)
Substituting for I from (6) and for Z from (7), the dynamic evolution of the system along an optimal path
can be expressed by (1), (2), (8) and (9). Linearising the system in steady state yields the following
conditions for this model with two state variables (four-dimensional problem)[Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986;
Satz 5.4]
1 T = -6(r+6)- 
	 (GzCiArHsz-GzHss+HiacHzz-PFKzil=-(Ä)2(Gxz)2) < 0
zzCH
D=	 A+ B+ C+ E+ F) > 0Hzzçu
where:
A= 8(r+6)GzglipzPFss-rPFsz)
B= PFss(GKGEPFsz-GzGKKri +GL,Giari-rPFEz)
C= PFss(GzGKPFzK-GzGKIGzK-GLEK-GKGziGicz+GzGzGlar+PFA7Gz-PFKKGzGz)
E= -PFsK(PFzsGzGic+PFzRzG,K+PFzipzr-FzxGzGz-riGzGzK)
F- PFsKPFzs (GzGziG KK-GzGziG 2CII)
Hzz
T2
and --D 0
4
13
These conditions must be met for the system to have two negative and two positive real roots. T is
defined from the following expression of determinants
■
aš
as aa.
ai ai
as aa,
ak at
ax
aft a fi
arc ap,
at al
aK
ai ai
aK
+2
while D is the determinant of the following Jacobian matrix for our system
aš aš aš aš
as ac
at art aA ak
as a a ag
ai ai ai ai
as arc aa,
aft a l  aft ail
as arc al, a il
Since the conditions are local, it is necessary for the starting points of the state variables (initial values) to
be close to (S,K) to be sure of the existence of an optimal path converging to the equilibrium path.
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Appendix 2
Comparative statics, keeping productive inputs (Z) constant
ds GA,(FsGi-rFK) Cl(r+Or
	  -	 D	
> 0
D
43 GAGK-10 
dr	 D
where D = Gi(PFssGK+rPFxs) < 0
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